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ADVANCING THE ARTS COMMUNITY IN NEW MEXICO
THROUGH MORAL RIGHTS AND DROIT DE SUITE:
THE INTERNATIONAL IMPETUS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF PREEMPTION ANALYSIS
CHANNAH FARBER*
I. INTRODUCTION
New Mexico has a vibrant and significant arts community that ranges from the
ceramic designs of Acoma Pueblo artists to the canvases of Georgia O' Keefe.' The
Santa Fe art market is an important economic force, 2 and the diversity of resident
artists throughout New Mexico contributes to the state's cultural identity.3 As a
means of protecting and encouraging the arts community, intellectual property laws
are necessary not only at the federal level, but also at the state level.4 This Comment
will argue that New Mexico should expand the existing intellectual property rights
afforded resident artists and will use preemption analysis to identify potential areas
of expansion.5
International, national, and local governments generally recognize the importance
attached to preserving the integrity of artistic creations for reasons such as aesthetic
significance, cultural heritage, creative inspiration, and market stability. 6 These
governmental institutions preserve artistic integrity through legal protection.7 Such
protection exists in the form of intellectual property law, the area of law that
concerns legal rights associated with creative effort.8 Within this area, common-law

* Class of 2007, University of New Mexico School of Law. I dedicate this Comment to my grandfather,
Charles Farber.
1. The percentage of independent artists in New Mexico (i.e., self-employed artists) within the nonemployer workforce is comparable to the percentage of independent artists in the non-employer workforces of other
states with major art centers, such as New York and California. In 2003, New Mexico artists comprised
approximately 4.7% of independent employment, compared to 5.3% in New York and 4.2% in California. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NONEMPLOYER STATISTICS 2003: ARTS, ENTERTAINMENT,
RECREATION (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/epcd/nonemployer/2003/nm/NM000_71.HTM (New
Mexico); httpJ/www.census.gov/epcd/nonemployer/2003/ny/NYOOO_7 I.HTM (New York); http://www.census.gov/
epcd/nonemployer/2003/ca/CAOOO_71.HTM (California); see also ALAN HAYES & JOHN BLOM, SOUTHWESTERN
POTTERY: ANASAZI TO ZUN150 (1996) (discussing ceramic designs of Acoma Pueblo artists); The Georgia O'Keefe
Museum Website, http://www.okeefemuseum.org (last visited Sept. 24, 2006) (describing the Georgia O'Keefe
collection at the O'Keefe Museum in Santa Fe).
2. According to the Santa Fe Conventions and Visitors Bureau, Santa Fe is considered the third largest art
market in the United States based on sales with 250 art galleries and dealers in the city. SANTA FE CONVENTIONS
& VISrrORs BUREAU, AWAY TO SANTA FE: CITY PROFILE, http://santafe.org/MediaCenter/Press.Room/City_
Profile/index.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2006).
3. While Santa Fe has grown as a center for contemporary art, its most historic and original art forms retain
their vitality and have also grown in both popularity and dimension. SANTA FE CONVENTIONS & VIsrroRS BUREAU,
AWAY TO SANTA FE: MEDIA CENTER (2005), http://santafe.org/MediaCenter/PressRoom/CurrentReleases/Sant
a_FeFirst_UNESCOCreativeCityin_U_S -_2005/index.html. As a result, Santa Fe has developed into a
world-renowned center for the contemporary, folk, and Indian artists who reside in New Mexico. SANTA FE
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARTS & CULTURE, http://www.santafechamber.comlarts/index.asp (last visited Sept. 24,
2006).
4. See infra Part III.
5. For the purposes of this Comment, the term "artist" will denote individuals who create works of art (i.e.,
"artist" will not encompass individuals who create works in areas such as film, literature, music, or drama).
6. DAVID BAINBRIDGE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (5th ed. 2002).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 3.
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countries have tended to stress the economic and proprietary rights arising out of the
creation of artworks. 9 Accordingly, intellectual property law in the United States,
as it relates to art, has traditionally centered around copyright law, which protects
an artist's pecuniary interest in the work of art he or she creates.'°
In response to international agreements, such as the Berne Convention, U.S.
intellectual property law with respect to copyright has begun to develop into a body
of law that encompasses rights originating in and embraced by civil-law countries. 1"
Specifically, U.S. copyright law has evolved to include moral rights 12 and may
further evolve to include droit de suite.' 3 In 1990, the United States expanded the
Copyright Act of 1976 to include the moral rights of attribution and integrity. 4 The5
United States has also considered implementing a federal droit de suite law and,
may soon enact this
given recent international developments, the United States
16
additional civil-law progeny of intellectual property law.
Although copyright and related rights (namely, moral rights and droit de suite)
are national rights implemented through federal statutes, 7 several states, including
New Mexico, have enacted moral rights statutes, and some have also passed droit
de suite legislation. 8 These laws are subject to preemption,' 9 at least to some extent,
under the federal copyright law. 20 An analysis of preemption is, therefore, instructive

9. Ruth Redmond-Cooper, Moral Rights, in DEAR IMAGES: ART, COPYRIGHT AND CULTURE 69-71 (Daniel
McClean & Karsten Schubert eds., 2002).
10. SIMON STOKES, ART & COPYRIGHT 3 (2001).
11. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No.
27, available at World Intellectual Property Organization Website, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beme/
trtdocs_woOOl.html [hereinafter Beme Convention]. The chronology of the Berne Convention is as follows: first
established on September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908,
completed at Berne on March 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948,
revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended on September 28, 1979. Id.
12. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d) (2000). Moral rights protect the artist's personal interest in the work
he or she creates mainly by regulating attribution of the work to the artist and by preventing derogatory treatment
of the work. See infra Part II.A. Whereas moral rights emphasize the artist's personal interest in the work of art he
or she creates, the basis of copyright is to protect the artist's pecuniary interest in the work. I JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 144 (2d ed. 1987). Thus, in the United
States, moral rights comprise a set of rights that are substantively separate from, yet structurally interrelated with,
copyright as part of the overall Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d).
13. See infra notes 310-314 and accompanying text. Droit de suite is the right of the artist to collect a part
of the price paid each time a work is resold. See infra Part ll.B.
14. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d).
15. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., LIBRARY OF CONG., DROrr DE SuITE: THE ARTIST'S RESALE ROYALTY,
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1992), reprinted in 16 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381
(1991-1992) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT].
16. See infra notes 310-314 and accompanying text. Droit de suite is sometimes characterized as an
economic right consistent with copyright. Jennifer B. Pfeffer, Comment, The Costs and Legal Impracticalities
Facing Implementation of the European Union's Droit de Suite Directive in the United Kingdom, 24 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 533, 547 (2004). The right may also be viewed as an additional moral right, however, since it derives
from the moral right of attribution, which allows the artist to be identified with his or her work. Michael B. Reddy,
The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REv. 509, 510 (1995). Regardless of its categorization, the right would, like moral rights, supplement U.S. copyright
law as an inclusion within copyright and, thereby, serve as a related right. See infra note 320 and accompanying
text.
17. STOKES, supra note 10, at 3.
18. See infra Partl.E.
19. Preemption occurs when a federal law takes precedence over a state law. See infra Part III.A.
20. See infra Part Ill.A.
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with regard to assessing New Mexico's current moral rights statute, the Fine Art in
Public Buildings Act of 1995,21 as well as New Mexico's possible enactment of a
state droit de suite law. This Comment will analyze the impact that federal moral
and resale royalty rights laws have or may potentially have on New Mexico and will
discuss the opportunities this state has to supplement federal law in the areas of
moral and resale royalty rights law that are not subject to preemption.22
Part H gives a background of moral rights and droit de suite beginning with their
civil-law origins 23 and explains the role the Berne Convention had in introducing
these rights in the United States.24 Part II also describes the introduction of moral
rights and droit de suite in the United States: the implementation of federal moral
rights law through the Visual Artists Rights Act; efforts to effect enactment of a
federal droit de suite; the ultimate decision to forego implementation of a federal
resale royalty law as a result of the Copyright Office Report on droit de suite; and
the recent European Union Directive on harmonization of the droit de suite that may
lead the United States to reconsider enactment of a federal resale royalty.25 Part II
concludes with an overview of state moral and resale royalty rights including a
summary of the law in New Mexico. 26
Part 1I analyzes moral rights and droit de suite in terms of the relation of state to
federal law. 27 Specifically, Part m describes preemption analysis in general terms
and examines moral rights preemption as well as droit de suite preemption.2 8 The
preemption analysis indicates possible areas into which New Mexico intellectual
property law can be extended. Part III thus explores these areas of expansion and the
rationale for doing SO. 2 9 Part IV summarizes the arguments in favor of expanding
intellectual property law in New Mexico and concludes that such expansion would
be beneficial.3 0
IT.BACKGROUND
Both moral rights and droit de suite derive from civil-law doctrine.3 The
adoption of these rights in the common-law system of the United States involves
incorporation into the existing copyright canon.32 While moral rights exist within the
framework of U.S. copyright law, these rights retain the theoretical basis of their
civil-law origins. Likewise, droit de suite, if enacted, would be incorporated into the
Copyright Act but would remain substantively distinct.3 3 In order to understand the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-1 to-3 (1995).
See infra Part mI.
See infra Part Il.A-B.
See infra Part l.C.
See infra Part HI.D. -. 4.
See infra Part ll.E.I-.3.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part IHL.A-C.
See infra Part III.D.
See infra Part IV.
See infra notes 34, 66 and accompanying text. Whereas civil law is the predominant legal system in

continental Europe, common law is the legal system in the United States. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263, 293 (8th
ed. 2004).
32. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d) (2000); see also infra note 320 and accompanying text.

33. Whether the addition of civil-law concepts to the common-law system of copyright will modify
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function of these rights in the United States, it is therefore useful to examine the
conceptual history of moral rights and droit de suite. Because the Berne Convention
was integral to the introduction of these rights in the United States, a discussion of
the convention follows the historical overview. This discussion leads into the
introduction of federal moral and resale royalty rights in the United States, the next
area of examination. A description of state moral and resale royalty rights legislation
concludes the background of these rights in the United States.
A. Moral Rights: A Brief History
The concept of "les droit morals" originated in France and was formalized in the
French Intellectual Property Code in 1957.' Under civil-law doctrine, the moral
right of the artist is usually classified as a right of personality,which is separate from
property rights such as copyright.35 Whereas copyright law protects the artist's
pecuniary interest in the work of art he or she creates, moral rights emphasize the
artist's personal interest in the work.36 Essentially, moral rights protect the artist's
personality, which is projected into each work of art he or she creates.37 John
Merryman, an intellectual property law scholar, explains:
The primary justification for the protection of moral rights is the idea that the
work of art is an extension of the artist's personality, an expression of his

innermost being. To mistreat the work of art38is to mistreat the artist, to invade
his area of privacy, to impair his personality.
Under the common-law system in the United States, certain moral rights were
integrated into existing copyright law through the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA). 39 Although moral rights in the United States do not comprise a separate
prong of intellectual property law, as in France, VARA, which amended the
Copyright Act of 1976, reflects the distinct focus on the artist's personality
interest.'

copyright itself is largely beyond the scope of this Comment. Rather, the focus is on how moral rights and droit de
suite may be understood within the United States and New Mexico.
34. Redmond-Cooper, supra note 9, at 71; see also French Intellectual Property Code art. L121-1 to -9,
availableat http://legifrance.gouv.fr.
35. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 144. In common-law countries, such as the United States, moral

rights have been incorporated into federal copyright law. The distinction that civil-law doctrine draws between
moral rights and copyright as separate bodies of law with differing purposes exists to a lesser extent in the commonlaw system. While common-law doctrine comprises a single body of law that includes moral rights within copyright,

the conceptual distinction remains since moral rights achieve a different aim than do the rights associated with
copyright.
36. Id.
37. Id. Within the field of art law, protection of the artist's personality is understood as legal recognition that
the artist has an interest in preserving his or her artistic creations since he or she has invested a part of his or her
being in the work. See id. The term "personality," therefore, signifies a sort of intertwinement of the artist with his
or her work, rather than specific qualities or traits of the artist. See id.
38. Id. at 145. Moral rights also indirectly address public rights. According to Merryman, "the idea that the
public has an interest in preserving the integrity of cultural property is not new, but it has only recently become
prominent in moral-right legislation." Id. In other words, although the legal right is held by the artist, the benefit
of these provisions also extends to society as a whole. Id.
39. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 384.

40. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
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VARA sets forth two moral rights: the rights of attribution and of integrity.4 ' The
right of attribution is the right to be identified as the author of a work of art that has
entered into the public arena.42 Attribution also extends beyond the acknowledgment
of the artist's identity to provide the right not to be identified.43 This aspect of
attribution allows the artist to avoid derogating associations with versions of a work
that are not truly representative of his or her creative efforts.'
The right of integrity acknowledges that the author of a work of art that has been
released to the public has a continuing interest in maintaining the integrity of that
work.45 The rationale for this lasting claim is based on the view that the work of art
is an expression of the artist's personality and, as such, the artist is entitled to
prevent the work from being dealt with in an abusive manner." Thus, the right of
integrity enables the artist to ensure that his or her work is preserved in its authentic
and unadulterated form, even after it enters into the public domain. 47 The right of
integrity may also encompass destruction.48 VARA, for example, precludes the
destruction of works of a "recognized stature. '

9

41. For a specific description of the rights of attribution and integrity set forth in VARA, see infra Part
ll.D. 1.
42. ART LAw HANDBOOK § 1.04[A], at 51 (RoyS. Kaufman ed., 2000). A work of art enters into the "public
arena" when the artist no longer possesses the work and the work is accessible to a portion of the public.
43. Id.
44. Id. Under French law, another element of attribution is protection against false attribution, the artist's
right not to have a work falsely attributed to him or her as the author. Id. In the United States, false attribution is
not explicitly included as part of the right of attribution outlined in VARA, though an artist may seek recourse
through the common-law doctrine of defamation or from the Lanham Act, which prohibits designations of false
origin and false description. Id. at 53-54.
45. See MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 144.
46. Id. Protecting the integrity of a work of art pertains to physical preservation of the work in its original
form. The application of the integrity right is illustrated by a case involving the French artist Bernard Buffet. Buffet
had painted the exterior of a refrigerator as an indivisible artistic unit. When the refrigerator was later disassembled,
the artist was able to enjoin the sale of the separated individual panels. See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator
of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1023 (1976).
47. ART LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 51-52.
48. Id. § 1.04[C], at 57.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000). In keeping with its unreserved tenor regarding moral rights, French law
condones destruction only as the result of "force majeure - an external, unforeseeable, and unpredictable event
which makes destruction necessary." Redmond-Cooper, supra note 9, at 76. To destroy the artist's work would
otherwise constitute disrespect for the artist's creation and would, therefore, violate his or her right of integrity. Id.
French moral rights not only provide more extensive protection, but are also more numerous. In addition
to the rights of attribution and integrity, protected by VARA, French law protects the right of disclosure (the right
to determine first publication or other release of the work to the public); the right to object to excessive criticism
(the right to address a review that the artist considers to be an unacceptable condemnation of his or her work by
printing a response in the publication in which the review appeared); the right to withdraw (the right to withdraw
works that have been released to the public and to alter such works); and the right to create (the right to prohibit the
completion of a work from being judicially mandated). SHERR L.BuRR & WILLIAM D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT
LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS ON FILM, TELEVISION, AND MuSiC 64 (2004).
The broad canon of French moral rights has served as an exemplar for other countries that have adopted
moral rights laws. While moral rights in the United States may not resemble the distinct body of law set forth in
France, the United States has, nevertheless, drawn on the central concepts of the French model to shape domestic
moral rights law. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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B. The Development of Droit de Suite
Like moral rights, droit de suite is a right that derives from civil-law doctrine and
may become a part of the common-law system in the United States.5" Droit de suite,
also referred to as the "resale royalty right," is the right of an artist to collect a part
of the price paid each time a work is resold. 5' Translated from French, the phrase
means "follow-up right."52 Droit de suite is based on the premise that artists are
entitled to participate in the increase in value of their works in ways that otherwise
are not addressed adequately by copyright law.53 An artist's expression usually is
embodied in an end product, sold to a single purchaser.-" Since the artist's current
work and reputation continue to affect the value of that earlier work,55 the droit de
suite allows the artist to collect a commission or royalty any time the work is
resold.56 The resale royalty, therefore, does not apply to the primary market
(transfers of works by the artist 57who created them), but rather to the secondary
market (subsequent transactions).
Some controversy exists as to whether droit de suite is an artist's right aligned
with the concept of moral rights or an author's right aligned with the concept of
copyright.5 8 John Merryman asserts that the right to a resale royalty, like copyright,
is a property right of the artist, not a right of personality. The droit de suite
primarily protects an economic interest that is consistent with the economic
emphasis of copyright law. 60 Alternatively, the right has been characterized as an
additional moral right since it derives from the moral right of attribution. 6' Still
another possibility is to characterize the droit de suite as a hybrid in keeping with
the 1948 Brussels Revision of the Berne Convention,62 which recognized the unique
status of droit de suite as half moral right and half pecuniary right.63 This view is
based on the fact that the resale royalty builds the right to participate in the future
economic exploitation of a work into the right of attribution by allowing the artist
to profit from his increased reputation. 64 Regardless of how droit de suite is
characterized, however, within the context of the U.S. intellectual property system,
a resale royalty right would, like moral rights, serve as a related right to copyright.65
Although classification of the droit de suite remains ambiguous, its origins clearly
reveal its underlying rationale and purpose. The resale royalty right originated in
France in 1920 and subsequently was codified as part of the French Intellectual

50.
51.
52.
53.

See infra notes 66,310-314 and accompanying text.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 382.
Pfeffer, supra note 16, at 533.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 382.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Pfeffer, supra note 16, at 533. To collect such a commission, the transaction must meet the requirements
set out by the law mandating droit de suite. Id.
57. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 213.

58. LEONARD D. DUBOFF ET AL., ART LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 358 (2004).
59.
60.
61.
62.

MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 213.
Pfeffer, supra note 16, at 547.
DuBoFFET AL., supra note 58, at 358.
Beme Convention, supra note 11.

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
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Property Code in 1957. 66 French authors were initially granted the exclusive right
of reproduction in 1791 and the right of performance in 1793.67 These two decrees
were concerned solely with the pecuniary rights protected under Anglo-American
68
copyright law and acted as the basis for French copyright law. While this
69
antecedent copyright legislation theoretically provided fine artists with the same
rights as authors of books, drama, or music, fine artists were in fact unable to exploit
7°
their works because of the unique nature of paintings and sculptures. Accordingly,
the rationale supporting a resale royalty was the need to correct the inherent inequity
contained in copyright law. 71 Abel Ferry, the original sponsor of the French droit de
suite bill, summarized the legal basis for this new right:
We are not asking for a share of the profits on a possible speculation, but for the
extension of the laws on artistic property, regardless of the existence of an
appreciation or depreciation in value. There is a gap in this developing branch
of the law on literary and artistic property. Literary men, musicians, and
playwrights.. .can exact for each recital, each performance, each publication, a
fee which occasionally gives them large revenues. They derive their fortune
from the people generally while the painter earns his living from the single
collector. What he creates cannot be published but has, however, the character
of personal property and this is why the provisions of a code drafted when
literary and artistic property was not even known are urged against him. While
the property of other intellectual workers is full and undivided, that of the artist
is incomplete.72
Under the French droit de suite, the artist receives three percent of the total sales
price of his artwork each time it is sold at public auction (or in theory through a
dealer), provided the sale price is above a set amount.73 The right is inalienable and
74
extends to the artist for his or her life plus seventy years. The French law originally
applied only to sales at auction but the 1957 revision expanded the right to include

66. See Law No. 296 of March 11, 1957, art. 42 (France), reprintedin JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT
E. ELSEN, LAw, ETHIcs, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 213 (2d ed. 1987).
67. Reddy, supra note 16, at 513.

68. Id.
69. Protection did not extend to craftspeople, only to those artists who created "fine art" (such as paintings

and sculptures of recognized quality). Id.
70. Id. Whereas, for example, the right of reproduction enabled the author of a book to reap monetary gain
from the multiple copies of the book, the right did not accomplish the same benefit for the artist who produced a
work of art in a one-of-a-kind form that did not lend itself to reproduction. After the initial sale of the work of art,
the artist did not continue to receive royalties as did the writer. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 386.
71. See Reddy, supra note 16, at 511-13; see also COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 386.
72. Katreina Eden, Comment, Fine Artists' Resale Royalty Right Should Be Enacted in the United States,

18 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 121, 125 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 213; see also French Intellectual Property Code, art. L122-8,
availableat http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=36. In 1987, droit de suite applied when the sale price

exceeded 10,000 francs. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 213.
74. French Intellectual Property Code arts. L122-8, L123-7, availableathttp://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml
?lang=uk&c=36.
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sales by dealers.75 Nevertheless, the 1957 codification required implementing rules,76
and these rules have not been issued." As a result, the French statute, in practice,
continues to apply only to sales at auction. 78 The droit de suite is collected in France
primarily through two private authors' societies: Socirt6 de la Proprirt6 Artistique
et des Dessins et Models (SPADEM) and the Association pour la Diffusion des Arts
Graphiques et Plastiques (ADAGP). 79 These societies are similar to American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI), the societies established to enforce composers' and performers' rights in the
United States.8"
Since its inception in France, at least thirty-six countries have adopted some form
of droit de suite. 8' Laws governing the droit de suite vary from country to country.
Whereas the French theory is based on the premise that an artist has a right to
participate in certain exploitive use of his or her creation, the German right 2 is
justified on the basis of intrinsic value. 3 The rationale is that any increase in value
of a work is due to the artist's earlier labors.8 The work's value is intrinsic in the
work in latent form and the artist therefore has a right to participate in the economic
benefit realized when the public becomes aware of this latent value.85 Accordingly,
German artists are given one-fourth of the difference between the present and prior
selling price, 6 as opposed to a set percentage of the resale price, as in France.87 The
Italian system, by comparison, is quite complex, with a sliding scale that allows the
artist a larger percent of profit when the profit is greatly in excess of the original sale
price. 88 Private sales are included only if the resale price quadruples the original
purchase price.89
Although the United States has not adopted a federal droit de suite, California
created a state droit de suite by enacting the California Resale Proceeds Right Law

75.

MERRYMAN & ELsEN, supra note 12, at 214. The current law states that "authors of graphic and three-

dimensional works shall have an inalienable right, regardless of any transfer of the original work, to participate in
the proceeds of any sale of such work by public auction or through a dealer." French Intellectual Property Code art.
L122-8, availableat http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=36.
76. The current law retains this provision and states that "[a] Decree in Conseil d'Etat shall lay down the
conditions under which authors may assert the rights afforded them by this Article." French Intellectual Property
Code art. L122-8, availableat http:ll195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&C=36.
77. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 214.
78. Id. A possible explanation for this operational preference is that sales at auction are the easiest to
monitor. Id.The sales are public, announced in advance, and often accompanied by widely distributed catalogs
containing identification of the artists and descriptions and provenances of the works offered for sale. Id. Proponents
of broader droit de suite applicability argue that operation of the statute discriminates against auctioneers. Id.
79. Reddy, supra note 16, at 516.
80. id.
81. Marilyn J. Kretsinger, Droit de Suite: The Artist's Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 967, 968 (1993).
82. DuBoFF ET AL., supra note 58, at 358.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.

Summer 2006]

MORAL RIGHTS AND DROIT DE SUITE

of 1976. 9' The California law most closely resembles the French form of droit de
suite. 9'
C. Berne Convention: Impetus for the Introductionof Moral and Resale Royalty
Rights in the United States
Moral rights and the droit de suite came to the United States largely through the
Berne Convention.9 2 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, an international copyright treaty regarding the protection of works
of authorship, has served to unify national intellectual property legislation by
93
introducing several standards to which its member states must adhere. In joining
the Berne Convention, participant countries are obligated to observe two main
principles: the recognition of copyright between sovereign nations and the
acceptance of a minimum set of exclusive rights granted to authors.' These "exclusive rights" apply to the artist's work and include its reproduction, adaptation,
distribution, and communication to the public.95 As part of the 1971 revision in
Paris, the moral rights of attribution and integrity were added to these copyright
concepts. 96 Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation. 9'
The article further mandates that member states implement domestic legislation in
accordance with these moral rights requirements and expresses that the duration of
the specified moral rights should equal that of copyright, though abbreviation to the
artist's lifetime is permitted.98
The droit de suite was incorporated into a separate article of the Berne
Convention in 1948,99 but unlike the rights of attribution and integrity stipulated by
the moral rights requirement set forth in Article 6bis, the resale royalty provision
constitutes an optional law for member states to adopt. 1°° Article 14ter(a) states that
"[t]he author...shall enjoy the inalienable right to an interest in any sale of the work
subsequent to the first transfer by the author of the work."'' Article 14ter(b)
90. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 231. Droit de suite did not exist anywhere in the common-law
its
enactment inCalifornia in1976. Id. at 213.
world until
91. See infra Part H.E.1.
92. Berne Convention, supra note 11.
93. MICHAEL A.EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 4-63 (3d ed. 1995). The Berne Convention
is a multilateral agreement administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization, an agency of the United
Nations. Id.
94. Brett Rowland,Breaking Down the Borders:InternationalCopyright Conventions andJurisdiction, in
DEAR IMAGES: ART,COPYRIGHT, AND CULTURE 81, 87 (Daniel McClean & Karsten Schubert eds., 2002).
95. See generally Berne Convention, supra note 11.
96. Id.
97. Id. art. 6bis.
98. ld.
99. DuBOFF ET AL., supra note 58, at 359.
100. Beme Convention, supranote 11, arts. 6bis, 14ter(a)-(b).
101. Id. art. 14ter(a).
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qualifies the right by stating that such protection "may be claimed in a country of the
Union only if legislation in the country to which the author belongs so permits." ' 2
The United States became a member of the Berne Convention in 1989.'0° In
joining the Convention, the United States became subject to Article 30(a), which
states that "ratification or accession shall automatically entail acceptance of all the
clauses.. .of this Act. '' °" Consequently, the United States was obligated to meet the
Article 6bis moral rights requirements but had the discretion to adopt or reject droit
de suite legislation set forth in Article 14.105 Jennifer DeWolf Paine, an art law
scholar, stated that moral rights have been perceived in the United States to significantly impair the commercial exploitation of a variety of copyrightable works."° As
a result, Congress resisted formal recognition of such rights under U.S. law.) °7
Congress instead effected a compromise in the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988 by declaring that existing U.S. law adequately provided for the rights
required by Article 6bis and, therefore, no special legislation was required to
implement this article.' 08 Congress further stated that membership in the Convention
was not evidence of a recognition by the United States of a higher degree of moral
rights protection than already afforded by the Copyright Act.)1
D. Introduction of Moral andResale Royalty Rights in the United States
Despite initial assertions to the contrary, ratification of the Berne Convention by
the United States ultimately led to the creation of new moral rights legislation as
well as more careful consideration of the droit de suite. Although certain areas of
law, such as copyright, unfair competition under the Lanham Act, defamation, and
contracts, provide some degree of moral rights protection,"' artists historically had
mixed success using these methods."' Perhaps in recognition of these shortcomings,

102. Id. art. 14ter(b) (emphasis added).
103. ART LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 1.04[C], at 53.
104. Beme Convention, supra note 11, art. 30(1).
105. Id. arts. 30(a), l4ter(a)-(b).
106. ART LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 42, §1.04[C], at 53. The rationale is that any right that is personal to
the artist would tend to conflict with the public's interest in a free-flowing social exchange. Patricia Alexander,
Comment, Moral Rights in the VARA Era, 36 ARtz. ST. L.J. 1471, 1472 (2004). Such rights are, therefore,
considered anathema to the system of federal copyright law, founded on the U.S. Constitution, which establishes
the "exclusive rights of authors as a means to maximize production of and access to intellectual creations." See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8. One way in which moral rights could impair commercial exploitation of a work of art occurs
when an artist transfers copyright to the owner of a work of art such as a museum. The right of integrity may enable
the artist to prevent the museum from freely displaying the work of art (and, by extension, receiving a profit from
admission fees). See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A (2000). If the work has been damaged, for example, publicly
displaying the work in its modified and inauthentic form would be prejudicial to the artist's reputation and the artist
would be entitled to enjoin such display. Id.
107. ART LAW HANDBOOK, supranote 42, § 1.04[C], at 53.
108. Id.
109. EPSTEIN, supra note 93, at 4-64.
110. ART LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 42, § 1.04[C], at 54.
111. Id. The right to prepare derivative works provided by copyright, for example, does not serve to prevent
modification of an artist's work of art. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580,582-83 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
the artist's claim that mounting her work on a tile constituted a derivative work and stating that if the artist was
"right about what counts as a derivative work, then the United States has established through the back door an
extraordinarily broad version of authors' moral rights"). Using a defamation claim to achieve moral rights protection
is also problematic because it poses a high standard: the artist must establish that the conduct being objected to
subjected him or her to "disgrace or ridicule by...his peers." Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (App.
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Congress enacted explicit moral rights protections for a limited class of visual artists
in the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, an amendment to the Copyright Act of
1976.12 VARA also acknowledged the resale royalty right contained in the Berne
conduct a study
Convention by including a requirement that the Copyright Office
13
States.'
United
the
in
suite
de
droit
enacting
of
on the feasibility
1. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Enactment of Federal Moral Rights Law
in the United States
The Visual Artists Rights Act incorporates certain moral rights into U.S.
copyright law." 4 Specifically, VARA grants to visual artists the moral rights of
attribution and integrity." 5 The right of attribution contained in VARA grants the
author of a work of visual art the right to claim authorship of the work, to prevent
use of his or her name as the author of any work he or she did not create (for
example, forgery), and to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of a work
of visual art in the event of a physical distortion, mutilation, or other modification6
or reputation."
of the original work that would be prejudicial to his or her honor
The right of integrity set forth in VARA provides the author of a work of visual art
with the right to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification
of that work that would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation. 117 This right
of a
also includes the right to prevent intentional or grossly negligent destruction
' 1 8 The
stature."
"recognized
a
of
is
work
the
that
provided
art,
visual
of
work
protection afforded by the right of integrity includes several exceptions: unless
caused by gross negligence, the destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of a work of visual art that results from the passage of time, the
inherent nature of materials, conservation, or public presentation is not prohibited
by the right of integrity." 9
The rights of attribution and integrity provided by VARA pertain to a narrow
range of subject matter. To this end, VARA offers protection to a more limited class
of works than does the Copyright Act. 2 ° Whereas copyright pertains to "original
2
works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression,"' '' the moral rights

Div. 1979). Furthermore, defamation cannot protect against destruction of a work of art because liability attaches
only for relaying a false message to a third party; when a work of art is destroyed, no message is created, thus no
liability results. See Cort v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2002). Contract theory can
provide some protection, provided the artist has preserved rights that fall under the moral rights doctrine, yet these
rights created by contract exist only between the parties, not universally. Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real
Obligations:A Property-Law Frameworkfor the ProtectionofAuthors' MoralRights, 69 TuL. L. REv. 935, 950-51
(1995).
112. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d) (2000); see also ART LAW HANDBOOK, supranote 42, § 1.04[C], at 54.
113. Reddy, supra note 16, at 525.
114. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d).
115. Id. § 106A.
116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Id. § 106A(3)(B).
119. Id.
120. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101, with 17 U.S.C. § 102.
121. Copyright protection extends to literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and
choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound
recordings; and architectural works. Id. § 102.
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provided in VARA extend only to works of "visual art."' 122 A work of "visual art"
is a painting, drawing, sculpture, or photograph produced for museum purposes only
123
that exists in a single copy or limited edition.
VARA protection does not extend to any "poster, map, globe, chart, technical
drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work,
book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, database, electronic information service,
electronic publication, or similar production; nor any merchandising item or
advertising, promotional descriptive covering, or packaging material or
container."' 24 In addition, VARA precludes from its coverage any work made for
hire and any work not subject to copyright protection under the Copyright Act. 25
The rights granted under VARA inhere only in the artist. 26 Thus, with respect to
the artist's work of visual art, transfer of ownership, copyright, or any exclusive
right of copyright constitutes neither a waiver nor a transfer of the artist's moral
rights.127 Although the artist's rights of attribution and integrity may not be
transferred, those rights may be waived if the artist expressly agrees to such waiver
in writing. 128 Moral rights run for the life of the artist, or in the case of joint artists,
for the life of the last surviving artist. 29
VARA does not provide protection equivalent to that provided by Article 6bis of
the Berne Convention. Unlike VARA, Article 6bis provides a right of anonymity
(the right to publish a work anonymously and to stop anonymous publication); a
right of pseudonymity (the right to publish under a pseudonym and to stop
publication under a pseudonym); and moral rights that are coextensive with
economic rights. 30 Most significant, Article 6bis applies to all works of art produced
' 31
by an author as opposed to a limited class of "visual art.'
2. Initial Efforts to Introduce a Federal Droit de Suite in the United States
Although the United States has enacted federal legislation with regard to moral
rights, it has yet to do so with regard to droit de suite. The first efforts to introduce
a droit de suite in the United States were made as early as 1940 by individual artists,

122. Id. § 106A.
123. Id. § 101. Section 101 defines a work of "visual art" as:

(1) a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in single copy, in limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a

sculpture, in multiple cast, carved or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a
still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is

signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author.
Id.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 106A.
Id.
Id.
Id. This is so because moral rights protect the individual artist against prejudice to his or her honor and

reputation. See id. When the artist is deceased he or she would not suffer personally from such prejudice.
130.

Brett Sirota, Comment, The Visual Artists Rights Act: FederalVersus State Moral Rights, 21 HOFSTRA

L. REv. 461,467 (1992).
131.

Id.
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writers, and lawyers who pressed for a resale right through unions, art journals, or
private contracts for sales of art works. 32 Proposals for bringing the droit de suite
to the United States were made in two seminal law review articles published in the
early 1960s.13 It was not until 1973, however, that the idea of a resale royalty
became well-known. 13" The widely reported confrontation between painter Robert
Rauschenberg and art dealer Robert Scull brought the issue to the public's
attention.' 3 5 At a New York auction, Rauschenberg became incensed when Scull
received an enormous profit on the resale of the artist's painting, "Thaw."' 3 6 Within
five years of that incident, Congress 37and the Ohio and California legislatures
considered the first resale royalty bills.
Unsuccessful efforts to amend the Copyright Act of 1976 to include droit de suite
38
have been made in both houses of Congress periodically since the late 1970s.'
Representative Henry Waxman of California introduced the Visual Artists Residual
Rights Act of 1978, which called for a seven percent royalty of the gross sales price
of works sold in interstate or foreign commerce whenever the sale price was 150%
over the purchase price. 139 In 1986 and 1987, Senator Edward Kennedy and
Representative Edward Markey introduced a bill proposing the Visual Artists Rights
Act.' 4 The bill, which was aimed primarily at guaranteeing visual artists the basic
moral rights protections contained in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention
(attribution and integrity rights),' 4' also provided for the payment of a royalty of
seven percent from the resale profit whenever the sale price of a work of fine art was
150% above the purchase price.' 42 Due to opposition from art dealers, gallery
owners, auction houses, and others, the resale royalty provision was dropped when
the bill was reintroduced in 1989. 43 Instead, the Copyright Office was required to
study various ways visual artists could share in the increased value of their work,
including a resale royalty.'" When VARA was ultimately passed in 1990, the

132. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 383.
133. Reddy, supra note 16, at 520 (citing Diane B. Schulder, Art ProceedsAct: A Study of the Droit de Suite
and a ProposedEnactmentfor the United States, 61 Nw. U. L REV. 19 (1966-1967); Rita E. Hauser, The French
Droit de Suite: The Problem of Protectionfor the UnderprivilegedArtist Under Copyright Law, 11 COPYRIGHT L
Symp. (ASCAP) 1, 13-14 (1962)).
134. Eden, supra note 72, at 127.
135. Id.
136. Id. Scull had purchased the painting from Rauschenberg for $1,000 and resold it for $85,000. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 383.
137. Reddy, supra note 16, at 521.
138. Id. at 524.
139. Id. at 525.

140. Id.
141. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at art. 6bis.
142. Reddy, supra note 16, at 525.
143. Id. A likely reason why these art sellers opposed the resale royalty provision is that without a collection
agency in place to locate artists and to distribute the royalty, the burden to do so would be placed directly on the
seller. Telephone Interview with George Bingham, General Counsel, The Peters Corp., in Santa Fe, NM (Feb. 14,
2006). The seller would include the royalty in the resale price paid by the buyer and then forward the royalty amount
to the artist. Id. The resulting additional paperwork would be time-consuming and would incur additional expenses
for the gallery or auction house. Id. These expenses would have to be compensated in some manner.
144. Reddy, supra note 16, at 525.
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requirement for a study on the practicability of enacting droit de suite in the United
States was retained.' 45
3. Copyright Office Report on Droit de Suite: The Decision to Forego
Enactment of a Federal Resale Royalty Law in the United States
The Visual Artists Rights Act required the Register of Copyrights, in consultation
with the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts, to study the feasibility of
implementing a resale royalty on the sale of works of visual art.'46 Accordingly, on
December 1, 1992, the Register of Copyrights released to Congress its 400-page,
47
two-volume report on the artist's resale royalty.1
The Copyright Office ultimately advised Congress not to adopt the droit de
suite. 4 Based on its analysis of the foreign and California experiences with droit
de suite, the administrative record, and independent research, the Copyright Office
found that sufficient economic and copyright policy justifications did not exist to
establish a resale royalty in the United States. t49 There was "insufficient empirical
data to accurately compare the respective remuneration of authors who create in
many, and artists who create in limited, or unique copies."'5 0 Moreover, no clear
evidence existed to indicate the frequency for resale works of fine art.' Thus, even
if Congress had determined that the Copyright Act treats visual artists less favorably

145. Id.
146. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 381.
147. Reddy, supra note 16, at 525. The report was divided into five parts, an Appendix volume, and an
executive summary.
Part I provides an overview of the history and evolution of the resale royalty in specific nations
like France, Belgium, Germany, Uraguay, and Czechoslovakia, as well as efforts to enact droit
de suite legislation internationally. Part 1Ireviews the American experience with resale royalties
with a special focus on both the California law and the various failed attempts to enact a Federal
Resale Royalty. Part if contains the Copyright Office's analysis of the testimony given at
hearings in New York and San Francisco and of the written comments that were submitted.
Id. In particular, the Copyright Office sought comment from artists, dealers, auction houses, investment advisors,
fine art collectors, and art museum curators. Berne Convention, supra note 11, at 381.
Part IV examines the various arguments made by the proponents and opponents of the droit de
suite. Part V explains the conclusions and recommendations of the Copyright Office regarding
the artist's resale royalty. The Appendix [of the report] contains copies of the comment letters
and transcripts of the hearings analyzed in Part Ill.
Reddy, supra note 16, at 525-26. The Copyright Office concluded the report by providing a model resale royalty
system for Congress to use if it later decided to amend the 1976 Copyright Act. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra
note 15.
148. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 390.
149. Id.
150. 1d The Copyright Office considered the argument that the resale royalty is justified by the difference
in copyright's treatment of fine visual artists, on the one hand, and authors and composers on the other. Id. at 386.
Proponents of the droit de suite argued that the principle benefit of copyright is to authors who exploit multiple
copies of works through either reproduction or performance, yet artists cannot fully avail themselves of these
economic rights since they create in unique or limited copies and their principal means of exploiting their
intellectual property rights is through the sale of their works or public display (subject to the first sale doctrine). Id.
at 386-87. Opponents of the droit de suite argued that the comparison is inapposite. Id. at 387. Although authors
who create numerous copies can reap the benefits of multiple exploitations of their works, they also have to sell a
large number of copies because they make such a small royalty on each copy. Id.
151. Id.
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than authors or composers, it was not clear to the Copyright Office that the resale
royalty would be the best means to offset this disadvantage.'5 2
While the Copyright Office Report stressed the lack of conclusive empirical
evidence, it nevertheless expressed concern regarding a number of arguments made
against the droit de suite.' 53 The Copyright Office recognized that the notion of an
encumbrance attaching to an object that has been freely purchased is antithetical to
the common-law tradition of free alienability of property.'5 Other deterrents
included the fact that the royalty raises privacy concerns with art transactions, the
royalty may have an adverse effect on the existing market for fine art, the
administration of the right is problematic, the royalty may benefit too few artists,
and the royalty may be unfounded due to the existence of factors other than the
continuing efforts of the artist that raise the value of the work. 5 5 These arguments
been vigorously refuted by art scholars and other
against droit de suite have
156
members of the art world.
Although the Copyright Office recommended against federal enactment of droit
de suite legislation, the report itself is not definitive because it was based solely on
the non-exhaustive evidence that was gathered by the Copyright Office during a

152. Id The Copyright Office noted that a broader public display right, a commercial rental right, compulsory
licensing, or federal grants and funding for art in federal buildings were alternative means by which to offset the
disadvantage. Id. at 390-91.
153. Id. at 387-88.
154. Id. at 387.
155. Id. at 387-88.
156. See Eden, supra note 72; Reddy, supra note 16; Carol Sky, Report of the Register of Copyrights
ConcerningDroit de Suite, the Artist's Resale Royalty: A Response, 40 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S. 315 (1992). In
response to the argument that the droit de suite is an encumbrance that interferes with the free alienability of
property, the National Artists Equity Association pointed to the fact that there is a long tradition of real estate
encumbrances in the United States such as deed restrictions and zoning laws. Sky, supra,at 320.
Regarding collector privacy, proponents of the droit de suite argue that France and Germany
automatically inform the artist and/or the registry of name, address, and selling price of all sales, hence privacy is
not a real issue. Id. Furthermore, a number of galleries in the United States already follow this practice. Id.
Those in favor of a droit de suite also reject the assertion that the primary art market would experience
a sharp decline in price due to the resale royalty right. Id. at 319; see also Eden, supra note 72, at 149-50. While
opponents argue that buyers will take into account a possible resale royalty fee and therefore pay less for the art in
the primary market, research indicates the opposite. Id. at 149. France, Germany, and Belgium, which have had a
droit de suite longer than any other country and therefore have the most experience with resale royalties, have
reported a steady increase in resale royalties and no decrease in the price of first sales due to the resale royalty. Id.
Similarly, in a 1986 California Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts study of the California art market, all responding art
dealers said the state resale royalty had not significantly affected their sales. Id. at 150. In practice, the resale royalty
has been absorbed into the art market without significant effect. Id.
Advocates of the droit de suite also dismiss administration concerns by arguing that a royalty on the
direct sale of an art object would be far less challenging to collect than a royalty for music played on the radio,
which has been accomplished in the United States for many years. Sky, supra,at 321. Finally, individuals in support
of a federal droit de suite counter the argument that too few artists would benefit by pointing to the lack of empirical
evidence in the United States to support this assertion. Id. Moreover, the French experience has not proven so
narrowly beneficial. The French collection agency for auction sales, ADAGP, gathered $10.5 million in resale
royalties in 1990 on behalf of 1,650 artists. Id. The estimate from these figures indicated that 1,600 artists shared
approximately eight million dollars, while only fifty artists received over $40,000 each. These figures demonstrate
that the majority of artists to benefit will not be the most wealthy. Id Even if the resale royalty were to benefit
primarily wealthy, popular artists, proponents argue that this result would not render the royalty ineffective. Eden,
supranote 72, at 147. This is so because the royalty is not intended as welfare legislation; rather, the resale royalty
right for an artist is similar to royalty rights for an author under copyright law: the royalty is intended to reward
successful authors and to create incentive for less successful authors. Id.
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limited period of time. 5 7 Moreover, the report suggested that Congress might
reconsider the merits of droit de suite should the European Community decide to
harmonize its existing droit de suite laws, and particularly if the European
Community elects to extend the royalty to all its member states.' 58
4. European Union Directive on Harmonization of the Droit de Suite: Potential
International Impetus for Enactment of a Federal Resale Royalty Law in the
United States
The Copyright Office Report described developments that might prompt
reconsideration of a federal droit de suite in the United States, and these
developments recently took place. In 2001, the European Union passed a directive
requiring member countries to implement a droit de suite on the resale of art.' The
directive lays down a common system of droit de suite with a uniform scale of
charges throughout the European Union.60 The Council of the European Union, an
institution of the European Union, found that the absence of the levy in some
European Union countries, its presence in others, and the varying ways in which it
operates unfairly distorted the European Union art market.161 Under the rules of the
European internal market, the Council considered it necessary to eradicate such
distortions of free competition. 162 In its prefatory statement, the Council stated that
"the Treaty [establishing the European Community] provides for the establishment
of an internal market... and for a system of ensuring the competition in the common
market is not distorted. Harmonisation of Member
States' laws on the resale right
' 63
contributes to the attainment of these objectives."'
The deadline for the implementation of the directive was January 1, 2006.'64 The
European Union, however, decided to give an extension to countries that did not

157. Reddy, supra note 16, at 526.
158. CoPYRiGhr OFcE REPORT, supra note 15, at 390.
159. Council Directive 2001/84 of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of
an Original Work of Art, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 [hereinafter Council Directive]. Note that the Council of the
European Union issues directives on the recommendation of the European Commission and the European
Parliament. These three institutions comprise the European Community, one of the three pillars forming the
European Union. Since directives serve as one type of European Union legislation, they may be referred to as
European Union directives despite the fact that, technically, they are the product of the European Community and
its three main institutions.
160. Pierre Valentin, Keeping Up with Art and CulturalAssets,WiTHERS NEWSL. (Withers, London, United
Kingdom), Summer 2005. Key terms set forth by the directive are as follows: The right, which is inalienable and
cannot be waived, is for the benefit of the author of an "original work of art." Council Directive, supra note 159,
at 34. Such works are defined as "works of graphic or plastic art such as pictures, collages, paintings, drawings,
engravings, prints, lithographs, sculptures, tapestries, ceramics, glassware and photographs, provided they are made
by the artist himself or are copies considered to be original works of ar." Id. at 35. The royalty is based on the sale
price obtained for any resale of the work, subsequent to the first transfer. Id. at 34. It applies to all acts of resale
involving sellers who are intermediary art market professionals (in other words, any dealers in works of art). Id.
Each member state may set a minimum sale price but that price may not exceed EUR 10,000. Id. at 35. The royalty
is set at a prescribed rate scale. Id. The royalty is payable by the seller to the author of the work and, after his or her
death, to those entitled under him or her. Id. at 35. The term of protection corresponds to copyright protection. Id.
161. Valentin, supra note 160.
162. Id.
163. Council Directive, supra note 159, at 33.
164. Id. at 36.
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have any droit de suite legislation prior to the directive. 65 The deadline for these
countries, which include the United Kingdom, is January 1, 2010.'66 Even then, the
member state may be able to obtain a further extension of two years, provided it can
offer the European Union a persuasive reason for the extension. 67 It is, therefore,
Kingdom to delay the implementation of the droit de suite
possible for the United
68
for over a decade.
Beyond requiring its European Union member states to implement droit de suite
legislation based on the common terms set forth in the directive, the Council also
expressed an interest in extending such harmonization to member states of the Berne
Convention. 69 The Council stated that "[t]he process of internalization of the
Community market in modern and contemporary art... makes it essential for the
European Community, in the external sphere, to open negotiations with a view to
14b [the droit de suite provision] of the Berne Convention
making article
170
compulsory."'
Although such an amendment to the Berne Convention has not occurred thus far,
the convention has already significantly affected federal legislation in the United
States. As discussed above, the Berne Convention led to the enactment of a federal
moral rights law' 7' and to the consideration of a federal resale royalty rights law.
Despite the Copyright Office's recommendation to forego enactment of a federal
droit de suite, the European Union directive will likely result in further consideration
of this particular right by the United States, even without a mandate
72 to do so
resulting from an amendment to article 14b of the Berne Convention.'
E. State Economic and MoralRights: A Separate Body of Legislation That
Coexists with FederalLaw
In conjunction with national as well as international advances in moral rights and
droit de suite legislation, the law governing these rights also developed on the state
level.
1. State Droit de Suite Legislation
California became the first state to adopt droit de suite legislation when it enacted
its resale royalty law in 1976, which went into effect on January 1, 1977, and
subsequently was amended in 1982.17 Since the California Resale Royalties Act

165. Id. at 35.
166. lId
167. Id.
168. In the past, British governments considered and rejected droit de suite on several occasions, most notably
when the Whitford Committee on Copyright examined it in 1977. Valentin, supra note 160. The Committee
concluded that the droit de suite was impractical and that it should not be introduced in English law. Id. Given its
dislike for the royalty, it is not unlikely that the United Kingdom will capitalize on the twelve-year grace period
provided by the directive. Id.
169. Council Directive, supra note 159, at 32.
170. Id.
171. See supra Parts ll.C, I.D.1-.2.
172. See infra notes 310-314 and accompanying text.
173. MERRYMAN & ELsEN, supra note 12, at 232.
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(CRRA) has been in place for thirty years, it has been a primary source for analysis
concerning the operation of the resale royalty right in the United States. 74
The California law requires the seller of any work of "fine art" sold for more than
$1,000 to withhold five percent of the resale price for the benefit of the artist,
provided that the resale price is greater than the original purchase price. 7 5 Fine art
is defined as "an original painting, sculpture or drawing, or an original work of art
in glass."' 7 6 The law applies when a work is resold in California or resold elsewhere
by a California resident.'77 In addition, at the time of
resale, the artist must be a
78
resident of California for two years or a U.S. citizen.
Although the artist cannot waive the right to receive royalties, he or she may
assign the right to collect them.'79 If the seller cannot locate and pay the artist or the
assignee within ninety days, then the royalty must be transferred to the California
Arts Council, which must in turn attempt to locate and pay the artist.' If, after
seven years, the council has not been able to locate the artist, it may use the money
to acquire fine art for public buildings.' 81 To collect an unpaid royalty, the artist
must bring an action for damages within three years of the resale or within one year
of receiving actual notice of83it, whichever is later. 182 The royalty lasts for the artist's
lifetime plus twenty years. 1
The California resale royalty has withstood one judicial challenge' 84 In
Morseburg v. Balyon, an art dealer brought an action challenging the constitutionality of CRRA and asserting that the Copyright Act of 1909 preempted the
legislation. 85 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that CRRA was not
preempted by the 1909 Copyright Act, that CRRA did not violate Due Process, and
that it did not violate the Contracts Clause. 86 There are serious doubts, however,
about whether the California resale royalty statute could withstand the same kind of
scrutiny under the current copyright law, which contains an amended, more explicit
preemption clause. 87 To this end, the 1992 Copyright Office Report on droit de suite
stated:
Any state resale royalty scheme may be preempted under section 301 of the
1976 Act because it inhibits the section 106 distribution right as modified by the
section 109 "first sale" doctrine (which allows the owner of a lawfully-made
188
copy, including an original, to dispose of the copy as he or she pleases).

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See, e.g., id.; supra note 12, at 231-38; COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 383-87.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

180. Id.

181. Id. At this time the artist's resale right terminates. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.

184. Eden, supra note 72, at 129; see Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1980).
185. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 975.

186. Id. at 972.
187. Reddy, supra note 16, at 523.
188. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supranote 15, at 384.
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Furthermore, while the CRRA was upheld with regard to Due Process and the
Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution,189 impermissible interference with
interstate commerce is another potential ground for constitutional attack that has not
been the subject of judicial review. 9
Beyond its legal viability, CRRA has received criticism regarding its operation.
Such criticism includes the law's application to sales outside California; treating the
difference between purchase price and the resale price as "profit" with no
recognition of commission, expenses, or inflation; giving the artist five percent of
the gross resale rather than a percentage of a profit, if any, on the resale; and
application to the resale of works acquired before enactment of the law. 9 '
Conclusions as to the law's practical value are more varied. One scholar observed
in 1987 that the statute "appears to have had little impact on the activities of most
museums, dealers, and collectors and seems to have generated little additional
income for artists."' 9 2 Similarly, the Copyright Office Report of 1992 stated that "the
law is widely criticized as underused and under enforced."' 93 By contrast, art
advocates, as well as studies commissioned by Bay Area Lawyers for the Arts
(BALA), show
that many California artists have received significant royalty
94
payments. 1
Since 1976, two additional jurisdictions in the United States have enacted resale
royalty provisions. 95 First, the state of Georgia recognizes the droit de suite as part
of its "Art-in-State-Buildings Program," under which the state agrees to pay a
royalty upon the resale of any art purchased with public funds other than as part of
the sale of a building. 96 Second, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico passed a
comprehensive moral rights law in 1988 that includes a requirement that sellers must
pay a five percent royalty to the artist from the profit realized on the resale of a
work. 9'7

2. State Moral Rights Legislation
Whereas only a few states have enacted droit de suite legislation, a greater
number have adopted moral rights laws. Prior to VARA, several states enacted
legislation to protect, to varying degrees, artists' moral rights. 198 Statutes in

189. Morseburg, 621 F.2d at 975.
190. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 12, at 233.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 238.
193. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 384.
194. Reddy, supra note 16, at 524.
195. Id.
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 8-5-7 (1991).
197. 31 P.R. LAWSANN. § 1401(h) (1991).
198. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., LIBRARY OF CONG., WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS IN VisuAL ARTWORKS (Dec. 1,
1992), available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/exsum.html [hereinafter WAIVER OF MORAL RIGHTS].
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2
203
California,' 99 Connecticut," Louisiana, 0 ' Maine, 202 Massachusetts, New Jersey,
°7
6
20 5
New York, Pennsylvania,2 and Rhode Island' all restrict uses of works of fine
art in altered or mutilated forms and grant authors a right of attribution. 0 8 Louisiana,
Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island exclude from the integrity right
2°
Other state statutes such as those of Utah,2' °
the destruction of a work
212of art.
Monana
2
Georgia, ' and Montana, grant certain protections to artists who create works on
commission for state sponsored programs. 2 3 New Mexico enacted legislation after
VARA to protect against alteration or destruction and to ensure proper attribution,
but the law applies only to works publicly displayed in state buildings. 14

3. New Mexico Law: Moral Rights Legislation Embodied in the Fine Art in
Public Buildings Act of 1995 (FAPBA)
Although New Mexico has not enacted droit de suite legislation, it is one of ten
states to adopt moral rights protection. In 1995, New Mexico enacted the Fine Art
in Public Buildings Act (FAPBA).2 15 The Findings section of the statute sets out
broad recognition of moral rights principles:
The legislature finds that the physical alteration or destruction of fine art, which
is an expression of the personality of the artist, is detrimental to the reputation
of the artist and artists therefore have an interest in protecting their works of fine
art against such alteration or destruction. The legislature also finds that there is
a public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations. 1 6

Furthermore, FAPBA offers protection to a more extensive class of works than that
prescribed by VARA. Whereas VARA covers "visual art" only (paintings, drawings,
prints, sculptures, and certain photographs), l7 the New Mexico law applies to "fine
art," which it defines as "any original work of visual or graphic art of any media
including any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft, object, photograph, audio or

199. CAL. CrV. CODE § 987 (West 1994).
200. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-116s, 42-116t (1995).
201. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 2151-2156 (1986).
202. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (1985).
203. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 231, § 85S (1996).
204. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, §§ 24A-1 to-8 (West 1986).
205. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 14.03 (McKinney 1983).
206. 73 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-2110 (West 1986).
207. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6 (1987).
208. ART LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 58.
209. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW 270 n.2 (2003).
210. UTAH CODE ANN. tit. §§ 9-6-401 to -409 (1992).
211. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-5-1 to -9 (1991).
212. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 22, ch. 2 §§ 401-408 (1983).
213. ART LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 42, at 58.
214. NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (1995); see also U.S. WAIVER OFMORAL RIGHTS, supra note 198. Based
on the limited applicability of the right of attribution and integrity provided in the New Mexico law, some scholars
have expressly omitted New Mexico from the group of states that protect moral rights. LANDES & POSNER, supra
note 209, at 270.
215. NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-1 to -3.
216. Id. § 13-4B-1.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).

Summer 2006]

MORAL RIGHTS AND DROIT DE SUITE

visual tape, film, hologram or any combination of such media of recognized
quality. '218 The scope of FAPBA is limited, nevertheless, because it grants artists
the right of integrity and the right of attribution only with respect to fine art in public
buildings, a restriction not imposed by VARA or by other state moral rights
statutes.1 9
With regard to integrity, the New Mexico law prohibits the intentional
commission of any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration or destruction of a
work of fine art in public view (on the exterior of a public building or in an interior
area of a public building). 220 The attribution right provided by the statute allows the
artist to "claim and receive credit under his own name or under a reasonable
pseudonym or, for just and valid reason, to disclaim authorship of his work of fine
art. ,,221 These rihs22iftm
rights endure for the artist's lifetime plus fifty years.222 After the artist
is deceased, the attorney general may assert the rights of the artist on the artist's
behalf and commence an action for injunctive relief with respect to any work of art
in public view.223

The central focus of FAPBA protection pertains to the removal of fine art from
public buildings. 224 The New Mexico law provides that, if the fine art in public view
cannot be removed from a building without substantial physical defacement, the
artist's moral rights are deemed waived unless they were expressly reserved in
writing.225 If, however, the removal of a work of fine art from a public building can
be accomplished without substantial harm to the work of art, the owner of the
building must give the artist ninety-days notice so as to provide the artist an
opportunity to remove the work himself or to pay for its removal.226 Under such
circumstances, the artist may waive his or her moral rights in a written, signed
document.

7

Since FAPBA proscribes moral rights to the public buildings context only, 228 the
New Mexico moral rights statute provides narrower protection than that provided
by other state moral rights legislation.229 In addition, as mentioned above, New
Mexico has no resale royalty rights legislation. While current New Mexico law with
respect to moral and resale royalty rights is limited, New Mexico artists,
nevertheless, receive protection from the federal moral rights law, VARA.23 °
Furthermore, should the United States implement a federal resale royalty rights law,
New Mexico artists would also receive protection from this law.

218. NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-2.
219. Id. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3. The Act defines "public building" as a building owned by the state or any of its
branches, agencies, departments, boards, instrumentalities or institutions. Id.
220. Id. § 13-4B-2.

221.
222.
223.
concurrent
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id. This provision implicitly recognizes the public interest in maintaining cultural property that runs
to the artist's personal interest in his work. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d) (2000).
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III. ANALYSIS
The intellectual property rights of New Mexico artists must be viewed in light of
the interrelation between federal and state laws. Preemption analysis of federal
moral and resale royalty rights indicates the areas of protection New Mexico may
choose to pursue.2 3 1 While federal law may preempt state law, those areas that are
not included within federal law and are therefore not preempted by it are open to
state legislation.23 2 This analysis examines federal moral and resale royalty rights in
relation to New Mexico law in order to identify how New Mexico might expand its
legislation to protect resident artists and foster its art market.
A. Preemption Generally
Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the laws of the United
States are "the supreme Laws of the land.. .any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 233 Accordingly, when a state law
conflicts with a federal statute, the federal law preempts the state law.234
Nevertheless, a federal statute must contain a clear indication that Congress intended
the federal law to take precedence in order for preemption of a state law to occur.235
Congress can reveal its intention to preempt state laws either explicitly or
implicitly. 236 Preemption law has, therefore, evolved into two distinct, but
nonexclusive, analyses by which courts will decide the validity of state laws.237
First, express preemption occurs when Congress has written a preemption clause
into the federal statute and the contested state law falls within the scope of that
clause. 23' The Copyright Act of 1976, for example, contains a preemption clause that
precludes state laws providing rights that are equivalent to those contained in the
federal statute. 239 The "extra element" test is the prevailing test for determining
whether a state-created fight is equivalent to the federal right. 240 Accordingly, state
moral and resale royalty rights laws that add additional rights may escape
preemption.
Second, implied preemption occurs when the federal statute contains no
preemption clause, or when the express language of a preemption clause does not
encompass the state law at issue, but preemption can be inferred. 4' Implied
preemption may take two forms. Conflict preemption arises when the state law
conflicts with the federal statute either by rendering compliance with both laws

231. See infra Part M.D.
232. See infra Part [I.A.
233. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
234. Wilfred P. Coronato & Stephen Lanza, The FractureThat Will Not Heal: The Landscape of Federal
Preemptionin the Fieldof Medical Devices, Prescriptionand Over-the-Counter Drugs Ten Years After Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, SL038 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 365 (2005).
235. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
236. Coronato & Lanza, supra note 234.
237. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
238. Coronato & Lanza, supra note 234, at 368.
239. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
240. Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
241. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
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242
impossible or by frustrating the congressional purposes of the federal statute.
Field preemption is found by inferring from extensive federal regulation of an area
that Congress intended to occupy that field fully, leaving no room for the states to
supplement the regulation.243
The categories of preemption analysis are not exclusive. Thus, preemption may
result from both express and implied indicia of congressional intent that a federal
statute shall preempt state law.2 4

B. Preemption of New Mexico Moral Rights Law
The New Mexico moral rights law, embodied in the Fine Art in Public Buildings
Act of 1995,245 has not yet been the subject of a preemption challenge. This absence
of judicial review, however, by no means indicates that the state law is immune from
preemption. To the contrary, the Copyright Act of 1976 specifically states that
federal law preempts the field for items within its scope, thus eliminating commonlaw copyright, and VARA, which is codified as part of the Copyright Act, enjoys
the same preemptive effect.246 In other words, the preemption clause of the
Copyright Act provides express preemption of both state copyright legislation and
state moral rights laws.247 With regard to moral rights, section 301 of the Copyright
Act, which extends to VARA, states that "all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of
248
visual art...are governed exclusively by section 106A and section 113(d).
Accordingly, VARA preempts state moral rights laws to the extent that the state
laws provide equivalent rights of integrity and attribution to those provided under
VARA.249
Congress noted in the legislative history of VARA that the federal statute
preempts state law if two conditions are met: (1) the works in which rights are
sought to be vindicated under state law must fall within the subject matter of
copyright as specified in 17 U.S.C. sections 102 and 103 and (2) the right is the
25 0
These two conditions offer
same or "equivalent" to those granted by VARA.
25
guidance as to how to apply the preemption language in the federal statute. ' Based
on this express preemption, it is probable that most of the New Mexico moral rights
law would be found invalid.
The Fine Art in Public Buildings Act protects "fine art" which, in large part,
252
satisfies the first VARA preemption condition regarding subject matter. New
Mexico defines "fine art" as "any original work of visual or graphic art of any media
242. Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497, 506 (1956).
243. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 504-06.
244. Main R. Scordato, FederalPreemption ofState Tort Claims, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 14 (2001).
245. NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (1995).
246. DuBoFF ET AL., supra note 58, at 350.
247. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).

248. Id. § 301(f).
249.
250.
21403333,
251.
252.

Id.
Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ.1226 DAB, 2003 WL
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 21 (1990)).
See infra notes 252-271 and accompanying text.
NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-2 (1995); see supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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including any painting, print, drawing, sculpture, craft, object, photograph, audio or
visual tape, film, hologram or any combination of such media of recognized
quality." '53 Since crafts and holograms are not included within the definition of
copyrightable material set forth in sections 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act,254 the
moral rights protection granted artists with respect to these types of works is not
preempted by VARA.
Furthermore, it is possible that works of "fine art" that qualify as copyrightable
but not as "visual art" may also escape preemption. Although legislative history
suggests that only those works that fall outside the scope of copyrightable material
may escape preemption,255 the language of the preemption clause itself suggests that
those works that fall outside the scope of works covered by VARA, a significantly
narrower category, may also escape preemption.2 6 The preemption provision
pertains to all "rights that are equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section
106A with respect to works of visual art.,25 7 Until this preemption language is
amended to state more explicitly the congressional intent revealed by legislative
history, one can make a strong argument for finding that state moral rights involving
works of art not included within VARA protection are not preempted by federal
moral rights. 58
This approach to the first element of VARA preemption would allow New
Mexico artists to receive state moral rights protection for a broader range of subject
matter. 9 Since VARA defines a "work of visual art" as a "painting, drawing, print,
sculpture, or photograph produced solely for museum purposes, that exists in a
single copy or limited edition," 6 ° New Mexico moral rights law with regard to
crafts, audio or visual tapes, films, and holograms would not be invalidated by the
first VARA preemption condition. 26' The rationale is that when a state statute
provides additional rights, such as the more expansive definition of protected works
in the New Mexico statute, the additional protections are not preempted by
VARA. 62 Based on this approach, moral rights concerning any painting, printing,
drawing, sculpture or limited edition photograph would still arise from federal law
263
only.

With regard to the second VARA preemption condition, "equivalent" rights, the
Fine Art in Public Buildings Act grants artists the rights of attribution and integrity
for "fine art" in public buildings .2 6' These rights are a limited equivalent to those
provided under VARA since the federal statute provides the rights of attribution and

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
notes 250,
264.

NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-2.
17 U.S.C. §§ 102-03.
Soho Int'lArts Condo., 2003 WL 21403333, at *12.
17 U.S.C. § 301(f).
Id. (emphasis added).
DuBoFF Er AL., supra note 58, at 350.
See id. at 350; Sirota, supra note 130, at 479.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
DuBoFF ET AL., supra note 58, at 350; see also Sirota, supra note 130, at 479.
Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 301(f), with NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-2 to -3 (1995). See also supra
255-262 and accompanying text.
NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3.
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integrity without restricting these rights to a public buildings context.2 65 The holding
in Board of Managers of Soho InternationalArts Condominium v. City of New

is instructive on this point because, like New Mexico, the language
describing the rights of attribution and integrity set forth in New York's moral rights
statute is largely equivalent to that in VARA. 267 The court held that VARA
preempted New York's moral rights statute, the Artists's Authorship Rights Act,
because both statutes were "equivalent" given their nearly identical provisions
regarding attribution and integrity rights.268 Since the provisions in the New Mexico
statute that define attribution and integrity likewise closely resemble those in
VARA,2 69 the New York court's decision suggests that New Mexico attribution and
integrity rights involving works of "fine art" that fall within the scope of "visual art"
would be preempted by VARA. 270 The state-created attribution and integrity rights
would not be preempted, however, for works of "fine art" that fall outside the scope
of "visual art. 27'
Since the VARA preemption analysis indicates that New Mexico moral rights
involving "fine art" that is not "visual art" are not subject to preemption, 272 it is
worth considering the viability of other provisions in the Fine Art in Public
Buildings Act with respect to these rights (in other words, attribution and integrity
rights concerning crafts, audio or visual tapes, films, and holograms). 273 The New
Mexico statute provides, for example, that after the artist is deceased, the attorney
York 2 6 6

265.
266.
267.
supra note

Compareid., with 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
No. 01 Civ.1226 DAB, 2003 WL 21403333, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003).
Compare N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1983), with 17 U.S.C. § 106A. See also
265 and accompanying text.

268. Soho Int'lArts Condo., 2003 WL 21403333, at "15.

269. There are two aspects of the New Mexico provisions regarding attribution and integrity rights that are
arguably different from those in VARA, yet these differences do not significantly detract from the equivalence of
the two statutes and therefore do not overcome preemption. First, whereas the VARA integrity right provision states
that an artist may prevent destruction of a work of recognized stature, the New Mexico integrity right provision
states that an artist may prevent destruction of a work but omits the "of recognized stature" caveat. Compare 17
U.S.C. § 106A(3)(B), with NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3(A) (1995). The New Mexico statute defines "fine art," however,
as "of recognized quality," which is essentially the same as "of recognized stature." The caveat regarding
destruction is therefore built into the New Mexico statute in a separate section. See id. § 13-4B-2(B).
Second, whereas the VARA integrity right provision conditions protection upon prejudice to the artist's
honor or reputation, the New Mexico integrity right provision does not include this condition. The court in Soho
International Arts Condominium, 2003 WL 21403333, at *13, addressed this issue and stated that
[VARA] will preempt a State law granting the right of integrity in paintings or sculpture, even
if the State law is broader than the Federal law, such as providing a fight of attribution or
integrity with respect to covered works without regard to injury to the author's honor or
reputation.
It is worth noting that, according to this view, a state moral fights law that is broader than VARA by virtue of
omission is, nevertheless, preempted, id., but a state moral rights law that is broader than VARA by virtue of
addition (for example, broader subject matter) is not necessarily preempted. See infra note 296 and accompanying
text.
270. The attribution and integrity provisions in the New Mexico statute not only closely resemble those in
VARA, but also those in the New York statute. Compare NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-3(A)-(B) (1995), with N.Y. ARTS
& CULT. AFF. LAw § 14.03 (McKinney 1983). This similarity adds additional support to the likelihood that, as with
New York, New Mexico attribution rights involving works of "fine art" that are not "visual art" would be preempted
by VARA.
271. Compare 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 301(f), with NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-2 to-3. See also supra notes 250,
255-262 and accompanying text.
272. Id.
273. See generally NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-2 to -3.
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general may assert the rights of the artist on the artist's behalf and commence an
action for injunctive relief with respect to any work of art in public view. 74 Because
this state provision constitutes an addition to the rights of attribution and integrity
defined in the federal statute, it is unlikely that VARA would preempt this provision
'
when it is applied to works of "fine art" that are not "visual art."275
It is less clear,
however, whether the attorney general would encounter a preemption issue by
enforcing an artist's moral rights in works of "fine art" that are included within
VARA protection as "works of visual art.'276
As opposed to the provision that allows enforcement by the attorney general, the
two provisions in the New Mexico statute that pertain to removal of fine art from
public buildings do not provide additional rights. 7 Rather, the provision regarding
removal that is possible without damage or destruction to the work of art is nearly
identical to its VARA counterpart, 278 and the provision regarding removal that
would cause damage or destruction to the work of art presents a direct conflict with
its VARA counterpart.2 9 Regardless of equivalence or conflict, however, VARA
preemption analysis indicates that New Mexico moral rights law involving works
outside the scope of VARA protection is subject to neither express nor implied
preemption.28 0 Hence, with regard to "fine art" that is not "visual art," the New
Mexico provision that reduces an artist's moral rights in favor of a building owner's
rights is not subject to implied conflict preemption even though it is contrary to the
VARA provision on this matter.281 Under VARA, if a work of visual art cannot be
removed from a building without damaging or destroying the work, the artist retains
moral rights in the work unless the artist has waived those rights in a written
instrument. 282 By contrast, under similar circumstances in New Mexico, an283artist's
rights are deemed waived unless expressly reserved in a written document.
Given the likely outcome of a VARA preemption challenge, New Mexico may
wish to modify its existing moral rights law to capitalize on protecting those areas
274. Id. § 13-4B-3.
275.

DUBOFFETAL., supranote 58, at 350.

276. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A. "Fine art" that is "visual art" satisfies the first element of the VARA
preemption analysis concerning subject matter. See supra notes 250, 255-258 and accompanying text. The New
Mexico provision regarding the attorney general, however, is an additional right rather than an equivalent right, and
it therefore does not clearly satisfy the second element of the VARA preemption analysis. See supra notes 240, 250
and accompanying text. Whether the New Mexico provision would be subject to preemption for "fine art" that is
"visual art" depends upon whether a court would be willing to find that the provision qualifies as an "extra element"
in relation to this specific body of art that is reserved for VARA protection. See supra note 240 and accompanying
text; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 301(0.
277. NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-3(F)-(G).
278. Id. § 13-4B-3(G); 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2).
279. NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3(F); 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1).
280. The New Mexico law concerning these works escapes preemption by the federal law because "fine art"
that is not "visual art" does not meet the first VARA preemption element. See supra notes 250, 250-262 and
accompanying text.
281. Compare NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3(F) (providing that if a work of fine art cannot be removed from a
building without physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of the work, the artist's rights are
deemed waived unless expressly reserved in a written document), with 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1) (providing that if a
work of visual art cannot be removed from a building without destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work, the artist retains moral rights in the work unless the artist has waived those rights in a
written instrument).
282. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(l).
283. NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3(F).
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that are not subject to preemption and, therefore, receive no protection under federal
law. Since moral rights involving works of "fine art" that are not "visual art" would
not be preempted, 2m New Mexico could further expand the scope of "fine art.''285 in
addition, New Mexico could extend the application of attribution and integrity rights
to areas other than public buildings. 286 Finally, New Mexico might reconsider the
provision concerning removal of fine art from a building that would cause damage
or destruction to the work.287
C. Preemption of State Resale Royalty Legislation
Whereas preemption analysis of New Mexico state-created moral rights may offer
insight into the viability of the current state law and reasons for modifying this law,
preemption analysis of state resale royalty legislation may offer insight into how
New Mexico should approach potential enactment of a state-created resale royalty
right.
At present, a state law that provides a resale royalty right almost certainly would
be preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976. Although the existing state resale
royalty laws remain intact (neither the California law nor the more recent Georgia
and Puerto Rico laws have been judicially reviewed for copyright preemption under
the current federal statute289), it is unlikely that any of the three laws could withstand
a challenge based on section 301, the amended preemption clause of the 1976
Copyright Act. 29° The 1992 Copyright Office Report on droit de suite affirmed the
currently tenuous nature of state resale royalty legislation by concluding that "any
state resale royalty scheme may be preempted under section 301 of the 1976
[Copyright] Act because it inhibits the
section 106 distribution right as modified by
29
the section 109 'first sale' doctrine. '
The Copyright Office's conclusion follows from the two-part analysis for
preemption under the federal copyright act.2' This analysis is based on express
preemption and derives from the language of section 301 of the Copyright Act,
which provides that "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright.. .and come within the subject
matter of copyright.. .are governed exclusively by this title. ' 293 Accordingly,
copyright preemption comprises two elements: "(1) the work in question must be

284. See supra notes 250, 255-262.
285. See NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-2(B).
286. See NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-3(A)-(B).
287. The implications of these amendments to New Mexico moral rights law are discussed in Part lI.D. 1.
288. COYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 384.
289. GA. CODE ANN. § 8-5-7 (1991); 31 P.R. LAws ANN. § 1401(h) (1991).
290. See, e.g., Reddy, supra note 16, at 523.
291. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 384. Section 301 of the Copyright Act is a preemption
clause that defines the extent to which federal copyright law preempts state law relating to copyright. 17 U.S.C. §
301 (2000). Section 106 of the Copyright Act enumerates the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. Id. § 106.
The distribution right set forth in section 106(3) of the Copyright Act provides the copyright owner the exclusive
right to distribute copies (including the original copy) to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership. Id. §
106(3). Section 109 of the Copyright Act modifies this distribution right by allowing the owner of a copy (including
the original copy) to sell it without the authority of the copyright owner. Id. § 109.
292. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
293. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
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within the subject matter of copyright as defined by 17 U.S.C. sections 102 and 103,
and (2) the state law created right must be equivalent to any exclusive copyright
rights in 17 U.S.C. section 106. ",2' A right that is the "equivalent of copyright" is
one that is infringed by an exclusive right of copyright: the act of reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display.295 If the state law provides different rights than
are available under the federal copyright law, the state law is not preempted.296
Although the two-part copyright preemption analysis appears to be designed to
prevent state copyright legislation,297 the Copyright Office's conclusion explains
how the analysis should be extended to include state laws that relate to copyright,
such as the resale royalty.298 To begin with, a resale royalty law pertains to works
of art that fall within the broad subject matter set forth in sections 102 and 103 of
the Copyright Act. 299 The first element of the analysis therefore does not require
modification. The Copyright Office's application of the second element, however,
signifies an adaptation of the copyright preemption analysis. 300 According to the
plain language of section 301 of the Copyright Act, the resale royalty right is not a
right that is the "equivalent of copyright" because none of the exclusive rights of
copyright infringe upon the resale royalty right (in other words, reproduction,
performance, distribution, or display of a work of art do not impede the artist's
ability to collect royalties from the sale of the work of art in the secondary
market). 30 ' Rather, the resale royalty right infringes upon an exclusive right of
copyright, the section 106 right of "distribution," as modified by the section 109
"first sale" doctrine. 30 2 The royalty inhibits the resale of a work of art, which is an
aspect of distribution.3" 3 Under the first sale doctrine, this particular aspect of
distribution is a right held by the owner of the work of art, irrespective of whether
the owner acquired copyright in the work." Such interference renders the resale
royalty right sufficiently "equivalent" to a copyright right and justifies
preemption.30 5
Implementation of a federal resale royalty law would require the qualification of
the first sale doctrine. 3 6 Section 109 of the Copyright Act entitles the owner of a
work of art to sell the work without having to take into account the rights of the

294. Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
295. Bd. of Managers of Soho Int'l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ.0226 DAB, 2003 WL
21403333, at "13 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2003).
296. Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 135. This component of preemption analysis is referred to as the "extra
element test." Id.
297. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
299. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102--03 (2000).
300. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
301. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); see also supra note 295 and accompanying text.
302. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 109 (2000).
303. Id. § 106(3).
304. Id. § 109.
305. An alternate explanation of the conclusion contained in the Copyright Office Report is that the Copyright
Office has added implied preemption (based on the conflict between the resale royalty right and the distribution
right) to the express preemption analysis under section 301 in order to find that the federal copyright act preempts
state resale royalty laws. See supra Part 111.A.
306. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 390.
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copyright owner.3"7 If a resale royalty right is added to the exclusive rights
enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act, however, this new right would
qualify the first sale doctrine in that the owner of a work of art would have to
observe the resale royalty right when he sells the work.3"8 Section 109 therefore
would be modified to reflect the effect of the new right. If such a change occurs, the
preemption analysis with regard to state resale royalty legislation will undergo
revision.3"
There is a strong possibility that Congress may indeed enact a federal resale
royalty law.310 In advising against enactment of such a law in 1992, the Copyright
Office Report suggested that Congress reconsider enactment if certain international
developments involving droit de suite take place.3 ' Specifically, the Copyright
Office Report stated that, "[s]hould the European Community succeed in
harmonizing existing droit de suite laws, Congress may want to take another look
at the resale royalty, particularly if the Community decides to extend the royalty to
all its member states. 312 These developments have taken place. 3 The recent
European Union Directive implemented January 1, 2006, requires that its member
states harmonize existing droit de suite laws and extends the royalty to all European
Union member states.314
Given the Copyright Office's recommendation and the recent European Union
Directive, Congress will likely consider establishing a federal resale royalty right.
Because unification in the art market is essential to its effectiveness for artists, the
harmonization of European Union droit de suite legislation presents a compelling
reason for the United States to establish a federal resale royalty right.3' 5 In effect,
harmonizing U.S. law with that of the European Union will enable artists to benefit
fully from the resale royalty right by reducing negative consequences such as a
substantial shift in the market to countries without a resale royalty as well as sham
sales. 6 The European Union Directive reflects the European Union's strong interest
in accomplishing such increased internationalization of the art market.31 7 The
directive suggests revision of the Berne Convention to make the droit de suite
provision set forth in article 14 mandatory for member states.31 8 Accordingly, this
nation can further enhance its leadership role in promoting international copyright
with article 14 of the Berne
law by passing legislation that creates, in accordance
3 19
Convention, an American version of droit de suite.

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

17 U.S.C. § 109.
See supra notes 302-307 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 325-328 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 311-314 and accompanying text.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 390.

312. Id.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra Part IL.D.4.
Council Directive, supra note 159.
Eden, supranote 72, at 136.
Id.
Council Directive, supra note 159, at 32.

318. Id.
319.

Reddy, supra note 16, at 546.
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The Copyright Office Report provided a model droit de suite system for Congress
3 20
to use if it later decided to amend the 1976 Act to include a resale royalty right.
According to this model, administration of the resale royalty would be the
responsibility of a private authors' rights collecting society comparable to ASCAP
and BMI. 32' The royalty would apply initially only to public auction sales and would
comprise a flat fee of between three and five percent on the total gross sales price
of the work.322 The term of the resale royalty right would be coextensive with
copyright and would be applied to foreign artists on the basis of reciprocity.323 The
royalty would apply only to works of visual art as defined in VARA and codified
in section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act.324
Although the model droit de suite system presented in the Copyright Office
Report did not address preemption, the addition of a resale royalty right to the
Copyright Act would likely include an amendment to the section 301 preemption
clause.325 The Copyright Office Report stated that "any droit de suite that is enacted
in the United States should be at the federal level. 326 Moreover, in passing VARA,
Congress demonstrated its ability to use section 301 of the Copyright Act to confine
copyright and related rights to the federal domain.327 It did so by adding express
language regarding moral rights laws to the section 301 preemption clause.328
The enactment of a federal resale royalty right, including the consequent
modification to the section 109 first sale doctrine and the likely amendment of the
section 301 preemption clause, would have significant implications for state resale
royalty legislation. 329 The resulting revision of the preemption analysis regarding
droit de suite would enable states to establish laws that expand the rights provided
by the federal resale royalty law.33 ° Using the VARA preemption provision in

320. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 392. It is clear that a federal resale royalty law would
comprise an addition to the Copyright Act since the federal moral rights law (which was considered in conjunction
with a federal resale royalty right prior to its enactment) comprises an addition to the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, 106A, 113(d) (2000). These rights are integrally related to copyright and do not constitute a separate corpus
of law. Moreover, the fact that the Register of Copyright produced the Copyright Office Report further affirms that
Congress views a federal resale royalty right as within U.S. copyright law. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra
note 15.
321. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 392.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 393.
324. Id. at 393-94. Although the terms outlined in the model are consistent with those set forth in the
European Union Directive, they are narrower with respect to subject matter and scope of application. Compare
COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, with Council Directive, supra note 159. See also supra notes 160,
320-324 and accompanying text. Whereas the U.S. royalty would pertain to a limited category of "works of visual
art," the European Union royalty extends to a broader group of "original works of art," and while the U.S. royalty
would involve auction sales only, the European Union royalty attaches to both auction and gallery sales. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15; Council Directive, supra note 159. Congress may wish to consider these disparities
in striving to most effectively harmonize U.S. law with that of the European Union. In 1992, the Copyright Office
could not have anticipated the terms of the European Union directive passed in 2001 and may now recommend a
model with provisions that more closely resemble those set forth by the European Union.
325. See infra notes 326-328 and accompanying text.
326. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 384.

327. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0 (2000).
328. Id.
329. See infra Part I.D.2.
330. One concern regarding implementation of a droit de suite in New Mexico is that the new legislation
would cause the art market to move jurisdictions. The California model, however, mitigates this concern. Although
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section 301 as a model, one can predict that the first prong of the preemption
analysis would remain the same: the work of art would have to fall within the
subject matter of copyright.33 ' The second prong, however, would change to assess
whether the state-created right is equivalent to the federal resale royalty right, just
as the VARA preemption analysis assesses whether the state-created right is
equivalent to the federal moral rights.332 The analysis would shift from copyright
preemption to droit de suite preemption.333 It would no longer be necessary to assess
whether the state-created right is equivalent to an exclusive right of copyright since
copyright preemption would no longer be at issue given the modification of the first
33
sale doctrine that would accompany enactment of a federal resale royalty right.
The "extra element" test is the prevailing test for determining whether a statecreated right is equivalent to the federal right. 335 Accordingly, state laws that add
extra elements to the federal resale royalty law would likely escape preemption. As
discussed in Part llI.D.2, if the United States establishes a federal resale royalty,
New Mexico could consider enacting a state resale royalty that applies to gallery
sales. 336 Additionally, state legislation might provide a resale royalty for a broader
range of subject matter such as that included within the definition of "fine art" under
the state moral rights law.337
D. Implications of PreemptionAnalysis: Opportunitiesfor Expansion ofArt Law
in New Mexico
Preemption analysis of state moral and resale royalty rights indicates that New
Mexico has an important opportunity to capitalize on the areas of these laws that
would not be subject to preemption.33 In so doing, New Mexico would foster and
encourage the state's prominent art market, sizable artistic community, and diverse
cultural heritage.339
1. Amendments to New Mexico Moral Rights Law
New Mexico should consider modifying its existing moral rights law, the Fine
Art in Public Buildings Act,' to protect more fully the areas that are not subject to
preemption and therefore receive no moral rights protection under federal law. First,
because moral rights involving works of "fine art" that are not "visual art" would not

California experienced a downturn in the local art market after the California Resale Royalty Act became effective
in 1977, the Los Angeles art market remains one of the three largest art markets in the United States. Eden, supra
note 72, at 151 n.193; Los Angeles at a Glance, CNN.coM (2000), http:lledition.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/
conventions/democratic/features/la.glancel. The initial adjustment in the Los Angeles art market, therefore, did not
adversely affect the market in the long term. Rather than diminish the Santa Fe art market, a resale royalty in New
Mexico would contribute to standardization of the major art markets within the United States.
331. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 248-249, 294 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 248-249, 294 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 306-309 and accompanying text.
335. Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
336. See infra Part Il1.D.2.
337. See infra Part lII.D.2.
338. See infra Part l.D.2.
339. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
340. NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (1995).
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be preempted, 34' New Mexico could expand the scope of "fine art."' 2 One such area
of expansion that would be particularly relevant in New Mexico is Indian Art.
Although New Mexico's Indian Arts and Crafts Sales Act (IACSA) provides the
partial equivalent of an attribution right,' this law does not provide the full benefit
of moral rights protection to Indian artists. By explicitly including "Indian art"
within its definition of "fine art," the New Mexico statute could extend moral rights
protection to these artists. 5
Second, New Mexico should consider extending the application of attribution and
integrity rights to areas other than public buildings. By granting moral rights to
artists whose works are displayed in museums or galleries, owned privately, or used
commercially, for example, New Mexico would act consistently with the stated
intention of FAPBA. 3" The Findings section of the statute indicates a broad
recognition of moral rights in the statement: "The legislature finds that.. .artists...
have an interest in protecting their works of fine art against... alteration or destruc'
tion."347
By confining artists' integrity right to art incorporated into public buildings,
however,
New Mexico withholds protection for a considerable portion of "fine
, 34 8
art.

By expanding attribution and integrity rights beyond the confines of the public
buildings context, New Mexico would not only act consistently with the aims
expressed in FAPBA, but it could also significantly develop its artistic community.
An economic study by William Landes shows that artists prefer to reside in states

341. See supra notes 250, 255-262.
342. NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-2(B); see supra note 285 and accompanying text.
343. Indian Art is a mainstay of the Santa Fe art market. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Indian
artists from the Zuni, Acoma, and Zia pueblos, for example, have created renowned ceramic designs. ART OF THE
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANs 206-19 (Gilbert T. Vincent et al.
eds., 2000).
344. NMSA 1978, § 30-33-6 (1991). IACSA requires every person selling a product that is represented to
be authentic Indian arts or crafts to make due inquiry of his suppliers into the true nature of the materials. Id. While
this requirement protects against fraud and false dealing, the IACSA offers only general protection with respect to
attribution. Id. The IACSA does not fully effectuate the moral right of attribution because it does not enable the
individual Indian artist to be identified as the author of his or her specific works. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A
(2000). While Indian art, such as ceramic design, for example, is often attributed to a particular pueblo, the specific
design is in fact attributable to an individual Indian artist and/or his or her family. Telephone Interview with Joyce
Szabo, Indian Art & Art History Professor, University of New Mexico (Feb. 17, 2006). The potter's signature is
almost universal today but it is a recent phenomenon of the last few decades. HAYES & BLOM, supra note 1, at
22-23.
345. The right
of attribution would enable an individual Indian artist to be identified with his or her creations.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. Tourist material containing a photograph of a ceramic pot, for example, would identify the
specific Indian artist who created the work. The right of attribution would also allow an Indian artist to control his
or her reputation; an Indian artist could prevent identification as the author of a particular art object, for example,
when photographs of that object are used in marketing materials that the artist finds distasteful. Id. The right of
integrity would also benefit Indian artists who, like contemporary Western artists, would enjoy the right to protect
against physical mutilation of their works. Id. The integrity right would be particularly valuable in the context of
preservation. While the right of integrity does not protect against modification resulting from conservation, the right
of integrity does enable an artist to prevent modification resulting from gross negligence. Id. The right would,
therefore, allow an Indian artist to ensure that his or her work is maintained in proper preservation conditions.
346. NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-1 (1995).
347. Id.
348. The artists whose works are sold in the over 250 galleries in Santa Fe or are exhibited in private
museums and cultural centers throughout the state do not receive moral rights protection for these works. See id.,
§§ 13-4B-1 to -3.
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with moral rights laws. 349 In fact, his study indicates that state moral rights laws
increased by approximately ten percent the number of artists that reside in that
state. 350 New Mexico's law is far more limited than those in the nine states that
comprised Landes' s regression analysis.3"' His study therefore supports the view that
New Mexico could substantially increase the size of its artistic community by
expanding its moral rights law.352
Finally, New Mexico might reconsider the provision concerning removal of fine
to the work.3 5 3
art from a public building that would cause damage or destruction
Although the disparity between the New Mexico provision and its VARA
counterpart does not give rise to implied conflict preemption for works of "fine art"
that are not "visual art" since these works are outside the scope of VARA coverage,
it is nevertheless worth considering the fact that the state provision is inconsistent
3
with the spirit and purpose of the integrity right set forth in the federal statute. "
VARA enables artists to protect their works of visual art from damage and, in some
instances, destruction. 355 The federal statute therefore creates a presumption that the
integrity right exists when the work of visual art may be damaged or destroyed as
a result of removal from a building.5 6 In establishing the reverse presumption, the
New Mexico law moves away from the purpose that underlies an artist's integrity
357
right: to protect artwork from damage or destruction. Moreover, this portion of the
New Mexico law calls into question the priorities accomplished by the state
statute.35 The findings section of the statute recognizes a "public interest in
preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations" and the provision that
enables the attorney general to enforce the artist's rights after the artist is deceased
furthers this interest. 359 Yet the provision that deems an artist's rights waived if
removal of his or her work from a public building would result in damage or
destruction impedes cultural preservation by favoring the interests of developers and
building owners. 36

349. William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished?, 25 J. CULTURAL
ECON. 283, 301 (2001).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 301-02; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 209, at 270 n.2.
352. After Landes's regression analysis, New Mexico enacted state moral rights law through the Fine Art in
Public Buildings Act of 1995. NMSA 1978, §§ 13-4B-1 to -3. Unlike the results in Landes's study, the percentage
of artists (painters, sculptors, craft-artists, and artist print makers) in the total civilian labor force of New Mexico
remained essentially the same. In 1990 artists comprised 0.3% of the labor force whereas in 2000 artists comprised
0.29%. See BUREAU OF BUS. &ECON. RESEARCH (BBER), UNIV. OF N.M., NEW MEXICO NONEMPLOYER STATISTICS
(on file with author); BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, N.M. DEP'T OF LABOR, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
INFORMATION (1990). The fact that Landes and his colleague omitted New Mexico from the group of states that
protect moral rights explains the result. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 209, at 271. In effect, the protection provided
by the New Mexico moral rights statute does not amount to the same protection provided by the other nine states
and, therefore, enactment of the state law did not produce an increase in artist residency as it did in the other nine
states. Id.
353. NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3(F); see supra notes 279-283, 287 and accompanying text.
354. Compare NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-3(F), with 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)l (2000). See also 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
355. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
356. See id. § 113(d)(1).
357. See id. § 106A.
358. See NMSA 1978, § 13-4B-1.
359. Id. § 13-4B-3(F).
360. Id.
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2. Enactment of a New Mexico Resale Royalty Right Law
If the United States establishes a federal resale royalty, New Mexico should
consider enacting a state resale royalty that applies to gallery sales and includes a
broader range of subject matter such as the works of "fine art" enumerated in the
" ' As with
state moral rights law.36
potential amendments to the state moral rights law,
the broader range of subject matter could include Indian at.362
A primary justification for the resale royalty in general is that droit de suite
addresses the unfair treatment of artists by current copyright law.363 According to
this view, copyright law mainly protects creations capable of being reproduced or
"copied" rather than individual objects. 364 A work of art is fundamentally different
from the other subject matter of copyright because its ultimate value lies in its
unique quality as a one-of-a-kind original, not in its potential for mass reproduction
or performance.3 65 As a result, artists are cut off from any further participation in the
subsequent economic exploitations of their work.3" Given the inherent limitations
for the economic exploitation of a work of art by the artist who created it,
proponents of the resale royalty argue that the traditional rights granted under
copyright law should be augmented with an additional right, the droit de suite,
which enables artists to receive a royalty for the ongoing enjoyment of their work
just as writers, composers, and other authors do. 3 67 If, therefore, one of the central
purposes of the resale royalty is to remedy an inequality, then providing the royalty
for auction sales but not for gallery sales creates a new inequality. By providing a
resale royalty for gallery sales in New Mexico, the state law would not only address
this new inequality with regard to the sale of art in New Mexico, but it would also
serve as a 68model for potential expansion of the federal law to address this
3
inequality.
Establishing a resale royalty right in New Mexico would also serve as an
incentive for creation, thereby promoting the artistic community and fueling the
local art market. Economic analysis of the droit de suite reveals that the residual
interest in early works provided by the resale royalty gives the artist an incentive to
maintain the value of those works that is absent without the resale royalty.369 Since
the art market in New Mexico is predominantly driven by gallery sales,3 7° the
361. Id. § 13-4B-2(B).
362. See supra notes 342-345 and accompanying text.
363. Reddy, supra note 16, at 532.
364. Id. at 534.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. The issue of inequality within New Mexico is somewhat secondary since the art market is driven
primarily by gallery sales. See infra note 370 and accompanying text. The fact that Santa Fe is one of the three
largest art markets in the United States, however, means that a state droit de suite that applies to gallery sales would
address the inequality on a national level. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
369. John L. Solow, An Economic Analysis of the Droitde Suite, 22 J. CULTURAL ECON. 209, 211 (1998).
370. A significant art auction in New Mexico is the annual Santa Fe art auction. Santa Fe Art Auction Home
Page, http://www.santafeartauction.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2006). There are several other small art auctions in
New Mexico but "auctions are not where the market is." Telephone Interview with George Bingham, General
Counsel, The Peters Corp., Santa Fe, NM (Feb. 14, 2006). Rather, the real force behind the New Mexico art market
is the thriving gallery scene in Santa Fe. Id.
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increased revenue provided by a resale royalty for gallery sales would encourage
could
artists' productivity and would in turn benefit the art market. New Mexico37
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371. SupraPartfl.E.I.
372. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 15, at 384.
373. NMSA 1978, § 9-4A-4 (2004). The department would require additional infrastructure to accomplish
such administration of the resale royalty. See id.
374. According to John Cacciatore, President of the Dartmouth Street Gallery, organizing a private collection
agency would be of great interest to art business entrepreneurs like himself. Telephone Interview with John
Cacciatore, President, Dartmouth Street Gallery, Albuquerque, NM (Feb. 14, 2006).

